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[L. A. No. 20939. In Bank.

Mar. 21, 1950.)

Estate of CLARA ROOD AKELEY, Deceased. RUSSELL
LEMMON, as Executor, etc., et aI., Respondents, T.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Appellant.
[1] Wills-Construction-lntention of Testator.-All rules of construction of a will are subordinated to the cardinal rule that
the will is to be construed according to the intention of the
testator. (Prob. Code, § 101.)

[2] Id.-Construction - Avoidance of Intestacy. - Presumptions
against intestacy are especiaHy applicable in construing residuary clauses of a will, since generally they are employed for
the purpose of making complete disposition of the testator's
property.
[3] Id.-Construction-Avoidance of lntestacy.-Constructions of
a will leading to intestacy either in whole or in part are not
generally favored, but will be rejected when the lan~age is
reasonably effective to dispose of the entire estate; and
liberal interpretation is employed to that end.
I
[4a, 4b] Id.-Construction-Meaning of Words.-Although words
denoting percentages have a technical meaning and "25 per
cent" mathematically equals one-fourth of the whole, a will
bequeathing the residue of the estate in 25 per cent portions
to three named organizations without making any disposition
as to the fourth portion may be construed as evidencing an
[2] See 26 Cal.Jur. 899; 19 Am.Jur. 387.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Wills, § 271; [2] Wills, § 286(4);
[3J Wills, § 286(1); [4J Wills, § 292(7); [5] Wills, § 292(5);
[6J Wills, § 348; [7] Decedents' Estates, § 1069.
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intent on the part of the testatrix to dispose of her· estate to
the three named organizations in equal shares where she was
unmarried, had no relatives of any degree of kindred, and
drafted the will herself.
[6] IcL..;.....Oonstruction-MeaDing of Particular Words.-It is the
duty of the court so to construe the language of a will that it
will conform to the testatrix' intention as disclosed by the will
rather than to defeat such intention by strict adherence to the
technical sense of particular words, especially where the will
ia not drawn by an attorney.
[6] Id.-Besiduary GUta.-Words in a will of gift of "all the
, rest; residue and, remainder of my estate" to three named
organizations, and in the event the bequest was in excess ot
that permitted by law then to a designated pe1'8On tree ot
trust for distribution by bm as the testatrix would privately
indicate, diacloses an intention to dispose of all of the residue
to the organizations named unless there were legal restrietions
limiting the amouDt she, could leave to charitj.
[7] Decedentlf Estatea-DistributioD-Appeal-Who may Appeal.
-The state ia entitled to appeal from a judgment decreeing
'., diiitributiOD of an estate to three organizations named in
a will where it had a possible interest depending OD the
interpretation of a provision in the will with regard to any
undistributed portion and hence was a party aggrieved by
the decree distributing the property otherwise.

<

'_ APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
; Angeles County decreeing distribution of an estate. New~'", comb Condee, Judge. Aftirmed.
r' ~> '
,t ,:", Fred N. Howser, Attorney General and Elizabeth Miller,
~;.. Deputy Attorney General for Appellant.

I:-~i~'

Sidney N. Bachtell, B.

,~. ~ewby for Respondents.
-~.~~!

D~an' Clanton and Newby, Hol~er"

.

'?t; SHENK; ".-This appeal from the decree of 1lnal distribu'. tion presents for consideration the question of the correct' ':" ness of the probate court's interpretation of the residuary
, clause in the. will of the decedent.
. Clara Rood Akeley died on November 1, 1947. She left
an holographic will dated November 14, 1946, declaring that
; abe was unmarried and had no living relatives of any degree
."9f.Jdndred. She made several specific bequests to individuals,
~'appointed Bussell Lemmon executor, and provided for fur.
'i'~, distribution in the following woro.:
~(,
...;"

.
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"Fifth, all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate
I give and bequeath as follows
25 per cent to the Childrens Home Society of Calif
25 per cent to the Mary Martha Home for Git·Is
632 Brittania Street, Los Angeles Calif
25 per cent to Los Angeles Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to animals, 3612 11th Ave Los Angeles, In the
event the total of the bequests to the above 11;1 lIIed Charitable organizations shall exceed the portion of my Estate
that I may legally give for charitable purposes, then all
such bequests shall be proportionately reduced to the
extent, that the total of such bequests shall not exceed the
maximum amount that I may legally give to Charity,
and in such event, I give devise and bequeath to Russell
Lemmon the Executive named, all the residue of my
estate, free from Trust, But with the request that he shall
distribute the same in such manner, as I shall have indicated to him. H
In his petition for distribution the executor alleged an
uncertainty as to the proper distribution of the residue of
the estate, and raised the question whether in accordance
with the manifest intention to dispose of all of the residue
it should be distributed one-third to each of the named charitable organizations; or whether the testatrix died intestate
as to one-fourth of the residue in which event such portion
would escheat to the State of California.
The State of California, through the attorney general, filed
a statement of claim by escheat to one-fourth of the residue
of the estate. After a hearing the court found that it was
the intention and purpose of the testatrix to dispose of all
of the residue of her estate to the three named organizations
in equal shares and so ordered distribution of the residue
which amounts to $41,023.19.
The State of California appealed, asserting that there is
no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of the will but
that the specific residuary bequests require a finding that the
testatrix failed to dispose of one-fourth of the residue of her
estate which is distributable to the State of California as
escheated property pursuant to section 231 of the Probate

Code.
[1] The controlling role is stated in section 101 of the
Probate Code which provides that a will is to be construed
according to the intention of the testator. All other rules of
construction are IRlbordinate to this eardinal rule aud in its
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application presumptions are to be indulged which will prevent entire or partial intestacy. (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal.
448, 458-459 [108 P. 287].) [2] Presumptions against intestacy are especially applicable in construing residuary
clauses, since generally they are employed for the purpose
of making complete disposition of the testator's property.
[3] Constructions leading to intestacy either in whole or in
part are not generally favored but will be rejected when the
.'language is reasonably effective to dispose of the entire estate;
: and liberal interpretation is employed to that end. (O'Connor
, "f. Murphy, 147 Cal. 148, 153 [81 P. 406] ; Estate of Hoytema,
., '180 Cal. 430, 432 [181 P. 6451 ; Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal.2d
;",108, 111 [77 P.2d 1052]; Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal.2d 683
~~'[107 P.2d 607]; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal.2d 1, 7 [108 P.2d
i,,' 893].)
f,~. [4&] Words denoting percentages have a technical meaning
~and "25 per cent" mathematically equals one-fourth of the
, ,whole. The attorney general assumes that the probate court
... was bound by the mathematical percentages specified by the
. testatrix and that the use of any other language could not
be deemed to create ambiguity with the specified percentages.
However, there is no rule of construction which would prevent
the court from applying the language of a will in accordance
,with the manifest intention of the testatrix even though to
, 'do so would require an interpretation not in accord with the
[,'technical meaning of words used. [5] On the contrary it
~Js the duty of the court so to construe the language that it
conform to the testatrix' intention as disclosed by the
f?~ rather than to defeat such intention by strict adherence
['to the technical sense of particular words. Especially in cases
'~f:where the will is not drawn by an attorney words which are
trepugnant to the clear intention disclosed by other parts of
~:the instrument may be regarded as surplusage or restricted
'application since to do otherwise would be to defeat the
; 'Intention. (Estate of Wood, 36 Cal. 75.)
~~ [6] The attorney general relies on the rule stated on page
r 112 of Estate of Beldon, supra (11 Ca1.2d) namely: That a
[',testator has the right to make a will· which does not dispose
~'.'Ot. all of his property but which leaves a residue to pass to his
D.l.'.,6., irs under the laws o. f succession; that such a will is not
~~e usual one but when the language clearly leads to that
lresuIt it must be given effect accordingly. The statement is
F,.apPlicable m the pr"'nt case beeause the testatrix left
I'
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no surviving heirs. The will on its face shows that the unmarried testatrix was fully aware of the fact tha.t she had no
heirs or relatives, and that she intended to dispose of all of
her estate. The words of gift of "all the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate" to the three named organizations,
and in the event the bequest was in excess of that permitted
by law then to Russell Lemmon free of trust for distribution
by him as she would privately indicate, discloses an intention
to dispose of all of the residue to the organizations named
unless there were legal restrictions limiting the amount she
could leave to charity. It is conceded that there were no
applicable limitations and no relatives have appeared to
claim any part of the estate.
[4b] The language showing a purpose and intention to
dispose of the entire estate, and the use of the specified percentages aggregating less than the whole, created an ambiguity which it was necessary to resolve before distribution could
be ordered. The language of the will and the surrounding
circumstances, namely that the testatrix was unmarried, that
she had no relatives of any degree of kindred, that this condition was contemplated by the testatrix, and that she drafted
the will herself, are deemed to have been considered by the
court in arriving at the interpretation which would conform
to the testatrix' intention as expressed by her will. The ambiguity was reasonably resolved in accordance with the court's
finding by the language of the will in the light of the circumstances disclosed (Prob. Code, § 105; Estate of Seay, 180 Cal.
304, 306 [181 P. 58]); and the mathematical figures were
properly disregarded as ~rplusage when a different intention
appeared by the language of the will drafted solely by the
testatrix. (Prob. Code, § 106; Estate of Northcutt, npra,
16 Cal.2d 683, 688.)
.AJj indicated by this court's decision in Estate of Northcutt
(at pp. 690-691 citing many cases), where the construction
placed on the language of the will by the probate court is
reasonable and appears to be consistent with the testatrix' expressed intention the appellate court will not substitute another although equally tenable interpretation.
The foregoing rules of construction and· review are determinative of the questions relating to interpretation of the
fifth provision in the will. The rules and decisions relied on
by the attorney general are inapplicable to control a different
result considering the particular facts of this case.
[7] The respondents who are the distributees named in the
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decree of distribution contend that the state was oot an aggrieved party and was not entitled to take the appeal. The
contention is based on the assertion that the state in no event
~ : could become a distributee since, so it is claimed, Rusaell Lem: -mon was named as the residuary legatee to take any portion
[.Juot distributable to the named organizations. [t was assumed
~::on the hearing before the probate court that the alternate
legatee would take only if the bequest to the or~riraniza'tl0118 was in excess of that permitted by law and, that
:'i.~.!ondltl0n not obtaining, any undistributed portion would esto the state. It is here also assumed that the State of
would be a distributee as to one-fourth of the
residue had the court made a contrary finding on the particuissue of interpretation presented by the executor. In any
of the case, however, the state had a possible interest
l"'c:lepe']lld.ing on the interpretation of the fifth provision of the
and it was a party aggrieved by the decree distributing
property otherwise. It was therefore entitled to appeal.
'The decree is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J" Schauer, J., and Spence, J., conl'RAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-In the fifth clause of her will,
testatrix made three bequests, each representiug 25 per
'of her residuary estate. Twenty-five per cent thus re11111&111ea unbequeathed. It is immaterial whether the omission
beneficiary was intentional or inadvertent; obvirMiHIlv·the court cannot add a beneficiary. Likewise it cannot
ltilier'wle the amount of the bequests; the will specifies 25 per
1IUIo.....~A~"t there is no evidence that 33% per cent was intended.
mtrocloctorv clause, "all the rest, residue and remainder
estate I give and bequeath as follows," designates the
. bom which the bequests were to be paid. The legatees
qwmtnm thereof were specified .. as follows"; there were
legatees. and each was to receive one-fourth of the fund.
II1I"I'11"",'"'' is no evidence that testatrix intended ~h8t they should
receive proportionate shares of the remaining one-fourth
fun<L
.
·i~ding such an intention into the will the majority
relies on the presumption against intestacy. There
I"b<nvE!Ve:l'. "no room for the application of the rule [against
Im".~) -if -the testator's language, taken in the light of
~iidiing circumstances, will not reasonably admit of more
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than one construction. A court's inquiry in construing a
will is limited to ascertaining what the testator meant by the
language which he used.. If he used language which results
in intestacy. and there can be no douQt about the meaning
of the language which was used, the court must hold that intestacy was intended.." (Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal.2d 108,
112 [77 P.2d 1052] ; Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430, 432
[181 P. 645]; Estate of Lyons, 36 Cal.App.2d 92, 95 (96 P.2d
1018]; Estate 01 SuUivan, 31 Cal.App.2d 527, 529-530 (88
P.2d 225]; Estate 01 Maloney; 27 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 [80
P.2d 998].)
I cannot agree that· this court is bound under applicable
rules of appellate review to affirm the trial court's interpretation of the will. The will clearly prescribes the disposition
of only 75 per cent of the testatrix' residuary estate. It is
not for the trial or appellate court to rewrite her will by
enlarging her bequests on the conjecture that the failure to
bequeath 25 per cent was unintentional and that had it been
pointed out to the testatrix, she would have divided it equally
among the three specified beneficiaries rather than have given
it to a fourth beneficiary.
The majority opinion relies on Estate 01 Northcutt, 16 Cal.
2d 683 [107 P.2d 607], for the proposition that "where the
CIOnstruction placed on the language of the Will by the probate
fOurt is reasonable and appears to be consistent with the testatrix' expressed intention the appellate court will not substitute another although equally tenable interpretation." It
is conceded that the trial court's interpretation of the will
was based solely on its terms, without the aid of any extrinsic
....evidence.. The dictum of the Northcutt case is not applicable
to the interpretation of a doeument when there is no extrlnmc evidence. "Whatever confusion might have existed in
the law on this subject prior to 1942 was set at rest by the
decision in Estate 01 Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343 [131 P.2d 825].
Since the decision of that ease it is settled law that the interpretation of a document, including a will or a decree, is •
question of law, and that it is the duty of an appellate court
in such eases to interpret the document independent of the
(!onstruction given to it by the trier of the fact, and to make
• final determination in accordance with the applicable principles of law.'; (Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152, 159
[177 P.2d 299] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d
825] ; Westena Ooal <t Mining 00. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819,
826-827 [167 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685]; U.w. Oil Co. v.
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Union Sugar Co., 31 Cal.2d 300, 306, 318 [188 P.2d 470];
Estate of Pearson, 90 Ca1.App.2d 436, 438[203 P.2d 52] )
The only evidence of testatrix' intention is her will. It
offers no support for the construction placed upon it by the
~ trial court and by the majority opinion herein. I would there; fore reverse the decree of distribution and direct the escheat
to the State of California of 25 per cent of the residuary estate.
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